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1 Introduction
In June 2009, the Egyptian parliament passed a
new quota law adding 64 additional seats, for
which only women can compete in the 454-seat
parliament. Yet up to the time this article was
being written, in June 2010, the executive
regulations had not been issued, posing a serious
challenge for women who wish to nominate
themselves, and precluding a critical discussion
of the content and nuances of this new
legislation. The quota – or what we know about it
so far – has generated intense controversy. On
the one hand, Mrs Suzanne Mubarak, the First
Lady, has said that the 64 seats represent, for
Egyptian women, a ‘test to prove her abilities to
qualify for the parliamentary seat and show her
ability to integrate into [the country’s] political
life’ (Al-Akhbar 2010). On the other hand,
Gameela Ismail, a leading political party figure
in the liberal el Ghad party, has established a
movement against the quota, arguing that it was
counterproductive to women’s rights because it
only served as a fast track to parliament for
‘Hawanim Garden City’ – Cairo’s elite.1 The
movement, she explained, will aim to mobilise
women from the opposition and women’s rights
activists into fielding women in the forthcoming
national elections of 2010, but not through the
women’s quota system (Ouf 2010).
This article examines the extent to which the
type, conditions and context of the quota are
likely to reinforce or contest current power
hierarchies, with respect to both the political
make-up of the country and its gendered political
nature. On the one hand, pro-women reforms
may be introduced to boost a country’s
democratic credentials, while on the other hand,
measures to reduce its threat to regime stability
are also enforced. The conditions of women’s
poor political representation outlined in this
article indicates a pressing need for affirmative
action to be instituted, yet the newly
promulgated quota is in many ways highly
problematic.
The first part of the article sets out the political
context in which the quota was born. It describes
the main characteristics of the spiralling nature
of authoritarian rule in contracting and
expanding political space. It then describes
historical and contemporary patterns of women’s
accession to political power in parliament and
how government policy has sought to both shape
and react to it. The second section questions the
extent to which the quota can serve as a form of
affirmative action if accompanied with highly
inhibitive conditions and enacted in a highly
inequitable political environment. The section
that follows examines what the quota signifies
for political parties and the power struggles
within and among them. Finally, the article
questions – without offering any conclusive
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conjectures – whether the quota is a pathway for
making politics more inclusive and democratic or
whether it serves to give authoritarianism in
Egypt a more female face. The article is based on
qualitative data of a primary and secondary
nature collected in the period between
September 2009–May 2010 as part of the
Pathways of Women’s Empowerment
programme’s work on voice, agency and
pathways to women’s political empowerment.
2 Introducing affirmative action in the context
of electoral authoritarianism
Making sense of both the authoritarian nature of
the Egyptian regime and the kinds of activism
taking place in what has become a highly volatile
political space is a challenge for understanding
how a policy such as a quota will play out. Egypt
can be described as a semi-authoritarian regime.
It typically allows for a certain level of political
and civil freedoms within contained, controlled
degrees, enough to give the semblance of
democracy, but not so great as to potentially risk
regime destabilisation. In that sense, it continues
to be authoritarian in that there is no prospect of
rotation of power or a real challenge to the
status quo. The ‘semi’ identifier is attributed to
particular elements, or parts thereof, of a liberal
democracy that are adapted, to give the
impression of being a democratising country
(Ottaway 2003). One element of semi-
authoritarian regimes, which is critical for giving
the semblance to the outside world of a
commitment to the principles of liberal
democracy, is the holding of elections. The
electoral authoritarian regime is one in which:
[E]lections are broadly inclusive (they are
held under universal suffrage) as well as
minimally pluralistic (opposition parties are
allowed to run), minimally competitive
(opposition parties, while denied victory, are
allowed to win votes and seats), and minimally
open (opposition parties are not subject to
massive repression, although they may
experience repressive treatment in selective
and intermittent ways). Overall, however,
electoral contests are subject to state
manipulation so severe, widespread and
systematic that they do not qualify as
democratic. (Schedler 2006: 3)
The above reflects the Egyptian political system in
which political pluralism exists in a highly
inequitable environment in which it is very
difficult to contest the hegemonic power of the
ruling National Democratic Party, led by President
Mubarak. In this context, there are serious
question marks as to whether the quota system
will in any way challenge the party status quo.
Egypt has seen a level of political activity, in the
past five years, that is unprecedented in its 50
years of authoritarian rule, with an ever-rising
number of protests held by a very wide array of
groups outside Parliament or the People’s
Assembly. Despite their contrasting and very
diverse agendas, one common feature is their
contestation of government policy. On the
ground, controlled political space is subject to
contraction and expansion upon the
government’s whims. This space has been used
by Kefaya [Enough], a political movement
opposed to the inheritance of power from
President Mubarak to Gamal Mubarak, his son,
as well as other emerging movements in
opposition to various dimensions of authoritarian
rule and increasing poverty. Despite the social
justice impetus behind many of these emerging
movements, women are hardly visible in political
leadership positions.
Women are also acutely absent from formal
political office. Women’s parliamentary
representation has always been consistently less
than 10 per cent, even in the short phase when
the number of women MPs were at their peak
(1979–1984), as Table 1 shows. Since 1979, the
situation has grown progressively worse. In the
last parliamentary elections of 2005, four women
were elected into parliament out of the 125
women who fielded themselves (Zahran 2008:
179). The President, who has the right to appoint
ten members of parliament appointed five
additional women, bringing the total number of
women in parliament to nine out of 454 MPs, or
2 per cent of parliament.2 In effect, the 2005
parliament had the lowest number of women
since 1976, and the lowest number of elected
women also since then. All of the five women
appointed were then recognised as National
Democratic Party members, none had previous
political experience or constituency. It is also
worthwhile to point out that the majority of
women elected or appointed are highly educated,
from the white-collar professional background,
and come from the upper class and are socially
and/or politically very well connected.
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Universal suffrage was gained in Egypt in 1956
by the newly independent nationalist
government. In 1962, the Nasserite government
enshrined a new constitution, which set a quota
of allocating ‘at least’ 50 per cent of the
parliamentary seats to farmers and workers. The
quota for farmers and workers was supposed to
empower the emergence of a parliamentary bloc
that would represent the ‘interests of the
majority’, in a context in which Nasser had
proclaimed a revolutionary government
committed to democracy and socialism (Shuman
2000: 6). Despite the transformations that the
country experienced in a shift from state
capitalism in the 1960s to an open market
economy in the 1980s to the present, the 50 per
cent quota for farmers and workers remains
intact. This is significant, in that when the quota
for women was first discussed in parliament,
there was much objection to the concept of a
quota itself on the premise that it violated the
principle of equality of opportunity, in spite of its
historical precedence for workers and farmers.
In 1979, the Sadat government, keen to show its
democracy credentials, introduced a new
Personal Status Law that gave women more
rights in case of divorce and sought to enforce
new restrictions on the practice of polygamy, and
a law setting a quota for women in parliament.
Law 21 stipulated that the country will be
divided into 176 electoral districts, and two MPs
will be nominated from each district, with at
least one of the two being from the workers and
farmers. The exception, set by the law, is in 30
electoral districts, where at least one of the two
seats must be occupied by women. In addition,
the law granted the President the right to
appoint ten members of parliament, of whom
two members at least must be women. Several
Egyptian writers have pointed to the significance
of the quota law being passed in the same year as
that which the Egyptian government signed the
CEDAW (El Borai 2000).
In 1983, Law 114 annulled the individual voting
system by absolute majority and introduced
proportional representation as an alternative
system. Article 3 of the Law stipulated that there
must be at least one woman on each party list,
but did not make any specifications regarding
her standing on the list. Of the 33 women who
made it to parliament in 1979, two were
appointed and 31 were elected. However, the
overwhelming number of women who were
elected were from the ruling National
Democratic Party with only two of them from the
opposition. Of the 35 who made it into
parliament in 1984, again, only two of the seats
were gained by the opposition (El Borai 2000: 5).
The poor representation of the opposition in
parliament points to the limitations of electoral
reform to challenge the power bases for
authoritarian regimes. As members of the
opposition are quick to point out, the conditions
of the proportional representation system were
highly discriminatory: a party had to win 8 per
cent of national votes as a minimum in order to
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Table 1 Proportion of women in parliament 1979–present
Year Number of women Number of women Total number of Total percentage of 
elected appointed by women in parliament women in parliament 
president (%)
1979 (11 Nov–21 April) 4 2 6 1.6
1979 (23 June) – 1984 33 2 35 9.7
1984–7 35 1 36 7.8
1987–90 14 4 18 3.9
1990–5 7 3 10 2.2
1995–2000 9 4 13 2
2000–5 7 4 11 2.4
2005–10 4 5 9 2
Source Compiled from data presented in UNIFEM (El Sawi 2008: 87).
win seats in parliament and the party had to
field candidates in each electoral district; in
electoral districts where a party wins more than
8 per cent, the additional votes do not count.
These conditions were set in a context in which
the ruling party had unlimited access to
government resources, to state-controlled media
and where there are severe restrictions on
political freedoms (El Naqash 2000).
The party proportional list system came under
attack from independent candidates who argued
that it discriminates against those who do not
wish to join an existing party. The law was
referred to the Supreme Constitutional Court
which ruled it out as unconstitutional and which
also denounced the women’s quota as violating
the principle of equal opportunities for all
citizens. Accordingly, Law 188 of 1986 cancelled
the 30 seats for women. The drop that
immediately followed in the parliamentary round
after that was attributed to the annulment of the
party proportional list (El Borai 2000: 6). Among
those who were appointed or elected from the
period 1987–2000, there was not a single new
female opposition or independent figure in
parliament (El Borai 2000: 7).
The low representation of women in 2005 was a
major embarrassment for the government. Much
effort had been put in bringing to the fore
women’s political representation and yet the
number of women who had fielded themselves in
the first place was quite poor: 125 out of 5,177
candidates.
In 2007, a series of highly controversial revisions
to the Egyptian constitution were passed. Among
the changes made was an amendment to article
62 to stipulate: ‘The law may also specify a quota
for the participation of women in both chambers’
(Tadros 2010). The National Council for Women,
Egypt’s principal national machinery for women,
was responsible for the mobilisation of support
for making the necessary constitutional
amendment and followed through with intense
lobbying within the government and within the
High Policy Committee of the ruling National
Democratic Party to garner support for a
proportional party list. Despite the NCW’s
efforts and use of political clout, the National
Democratic Party finally opted for a reserved
seat system quota, one which was vehemently
opposed by members of all the opposition parties
in parliament. Conspicuously absent from these
debates was the voice of the women’s movement
in Egypt.
3 Women’s quota as affirmative action: a
possible oxymoron?
On one level, associating the quota with
affirmative action seems somewhat self-
contradictory. The idea behind affirmative action
is that it is a fast track pathway to political
office: setting aside 64 seats for which only
women can compete was intended to enhance
their opportunities for claiming political office,
since they would not be competing against men.
On the other hand, the quota set conditions for
winning the elections that are significantly more
inhibitive than for candidates fielding
themselves for non-quota seats under the
conventional electoral law. To what extent, then,
can the quota be a fast track, when the pathway
is laden with additional electoral burdens? Under
the quota law, the size of the electoral district is
not the same as the electoral district for citizens
competing for non-quota seats. The size of the
electoral district or constituency, according to
official statements, will be manifold larger for
women competing for quota seats compared with
women and men competing for non-quota seats.
The former may be delineated along governorate
lines, while the latter is delineated along a set of
villages or a municipality.
The scale of the problem has deepened with the
delay in issuing the executive regulations that
would define the parameters of the electoral
district, and therefore allow candidates to
identify their constituency. It is unclear yet how
the 64 seats will be divided across the country.
Egypt has 29 governorates, so there are two seats
for which women will compete in each
governorate, amounting to 58 in total. The
governorates of Cairo, Beheira and Sharqia,
being the largest governorates in terms of
population, would each receive two additional
seats for which women can compete. Another
possible scenario is that rather than designating
the entire governorate as the electoral district for
which women compete, the executive regulations
of the law would designate alternative
parameters to the electoral district. How this
would be done in a way which bears in mind the
drastic differences in population size and would
not discriminate in favour of a particular political
party in terms of its constituency are details that
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the executive regulations would, in such a
scenario, have to explain. Sources say that the
executive regulations must come out before
parliament breaks for the summer holidays at the
end of June.
In view of the large geographic parameters of the
electoral district, if the above scenario is enacted
in the executive regulation, the quota will be
interpreted as a signal that the political pathway
to a parliamentary seat is not through the
mobilisation of a constituency. One of the women
interviewed for this study, a member of the
opposition party, pointed out that:3
It is not feasible that you gain political recognition
and office sufficient to get the whole governorate to
nominate you. It is not realistic, nor feasible. It is
hard enough to cover a district, whether for a man or a
woman.
Shadya Khodeir, a well-ranked member of the
ruling party, with over two decades of political
experience says that she fears that some of the
quota seats will be given to women who are well
known media or public figures, but who do not
necessarily have a constituency:
If I field myself against a man I know, well I have a
standing in sixteen constituency units [that back me
up]. Compare this to a woman being brought in by a
parachute and telling people that she is a public
figure ... and this is the fear from the next stage, that
they bring women media figures, who will take these
seats and who have no connection with the people or a
constituency.
In such a scenario, in lieu of winning via building
a constituency, women may resort to the political
backing of the ruling national democratic party
or tagging on the governor’s office (and
therefore being afforded outreach and political
power by association) or acquiring significant
media outreach or a combination of all. In all
cases, the extent to which a non-constituency
pathway to office is a legitimate one will be
questioned. It is no surprise that one candidate
from the opposition party commented: ‘In short
it is going to be a majlis hawanim [the upper class
ladies’ parliament]’.
While the quota as a fast track does not mean it is
a panacea for all the political ills inherent in any
system, nevertheless, it is significant that it was
introduced in a context where gender-based forms
of biases as well as more general structural biases
have worked to undermine women’s political
representation. The gender-specific factors
associated with poor political representation
include an increasingly conservative social
environment towards women’s equality in general.
It is also an environment deeply affected and
infiltrated by the Saudi-inspired ultra-reactionary
Wahabi Islam, and its emphasis on rigid, gender
divisions of labour (read: emphasis on women’s
domestic roles) and power hierarchies (read: the
supremacy of men over women). Opponents (men
and women) can spread rumours about amoral
behaviour of women MPs. In contexts where
honour and reputation make women particularly
vulnerable to all kinds of social and family
stigmatisations, many women, feeling vulnerable,
prefer to step down rather than have their
familial and social relations affected by the spread
of rumours. Moreover, women nominating
themselves who are not backed and surrounded by
a circle of protégés may also be vulnerable to
sexual harassment, threats and intimidation.
These factors can all be accommodated if women
nominating themselves were firmly and strongly
backed by either family/clan/tribe/political party
or constituency – or all of these together. Not all
women have the social and political capital to
withstand these gender-specific forms of
harassment.
Structural or contextual inhibitions in the
Egyptian political system have also undermined
the opportunities of political representation for
the majority of Egyptians. They include the all-
pervasive role of the National Democratic Party
in the country’s political life, the exercise of vote
rigging and other measures, which undermine
the integrity of the electoral process itself.
Political marginalisation is also salient, on the
basis of class, lack of social connections, religious
affiliation (i.e. if the person is a member of a
religious minority) or political orientation
(Muslim Brotherhood members have been
exposed to sporadic waves of repression).
Moreover, the fact that the ceiling on electoral
expenditure is never respected suggests that
candidates with an unlimited financial resource
base are well positioned to purchase votes – a
common phenomenon in many electoral districts.
The financing of election campaigns is gendered
in many ways. Several women considering
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running for political office mentioned that male
candidates can tap into the family budget to
finance their election campaign, but when female
candidates do so, it is considered unjustifiable
and associated with squandering the family
funds. ‘Women just don’t have the financial
independence necessary to spend according to
election campaign needs’, commented one
woman who said that she would only field the
elections if the National Democratic Party
supported her election campaign costs.
The wide use of thuggery and violence has also
intimidated both voters and elected candidates.
Soad el Damlawy, who fielded the 2000 elections
and lost, attributed her loss to vote rigging and
violence:4
I was exposed to a lot of violence: they brought the
police on horses and with police dogs and the worst
[thing] was they brought the women from prison with
microphones and they were swearing at the women
going into the voting office and harassing them. They
prevented my husband from going into the electoral
voting booth and prevented people from going in to
vote and they tried to stop me and I said I will go
inside in spite of you because I am one of the nominees
and one of the policemen attacked me with a stick,
breaking my finger.
She pointed out that she will only consider
entering the 2010 elections if she is backed by the
ruling party, who would ‘protect’ her from
exposure to this violence. Many of the prospective
women candidates interviewed for this study, who
were affiliated to the ruling party, argued that
they would only field themselves if they were put
forward by the National Democratic Party (NDP);
among the reasons cited were: protection from
exposure to violence and thuggery, access to a
constituency through the party outreach
networks, wide publicity and that they would
influence the final outcome of the elections.
4 Quotas transforming party politics?
The women’s quota does not defy, in any
fundamental way, the hegemony of the ruling
National Democratic Party. According to leading
members of all the opposition parties who were
interviewed, the National Democratic Party is
expected to win the majority of the 64 seats
allocated (although all argue that the NDP would
have won a majority anyway without the women’s
quota). Mounir Fakhry Abd el Nour, secretary
general of the liberal Wafd5 party, argued that in
view of the logistical difficulties of covering the
exceptionally large electoral district, it is
unrealistic to expect true competition or true
representation of a constituency. Hence, the kind
of political backing needed to win is likely to
exceed the abilities of those who do not have the
full backing of the government.6 Fareeda el
Naqash, feminist and head of the women’s
committee in el Tagammu, argued that while
feminists have long been lobbying for the
introduction of affirmative action, this was not the
kind of measure that was expected. She suggests
that the kind of quota that would have been
desirable would have been an open proportional
list that is unconditional and that would have
allowed for both parties and independents to
compete.7 She added that a quota that puts the
focus on the individual allows for individual use of
finances, thuggery and violence to garner personal
support, whereas a party proportional list system
would encourage the citizenry not to vote for a
person but for a political party programme:
A party proportional list would not obliterate the
importance of individuals and their personal
contribution, but would make it secondary to the
actual party programme.
In the Egyptian context where there is a lack of
real political party commitment to women in
political leadership, the proportional party list
would have forced them to redress this internal
gender imbalance. The reserved seat system will
certainly encourage parties to field women in the
bid to win parliamentary seats. However, its
transformative impact on the internal party
structure is limited, especially as parties are not
required to reconsider their existing list of male
candidates but supplement them with women.
This ‘add-on’ quota has been criticised by
women’s organisations for signalling to the public
‘that men have incontestably exclusive rights to
the original seats, in the present and the future’
(Marei 2009: 32). It is believed that despite the
internal resistance to the principle of a quota
expressed from within the internal political
apparatus of the ruling party, they finally
conceded to the additional seats option because it
does not involve any power-sharing between the
predominantly male majority and the women, nor
does it pose a real threat to the complex internal
patronage system for the allocation of seats and
resources to its elite male leadership.
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All political parties’ nomination of women
candidates has been consistently poor. For the
last parliamentary elections of 2005, the ruling
National Democratic Party fielded only six
women out of the hundreds nominated, the
Tagammu leftist party, which is the party most
reputed with supporting women candidates,
fielded four women and the Muslim Brotherhood
and Wafd each fielded one woman (Zahran 2008:
168). None of the women candidates from the
opposition won in the elections. Out of the four
that won, one belonged to the National
Democratic Party, and the three others ran as
independent candidates but then joined the
ruling party after winning. This reflects the
overall trend in the national elections in which
the ruling party won only 33 per cent of the vote
(145 seats) but became the overwhelming
majority in parliament when 166 members who
ran as independents joined the NDP, thus giving
them 311 seats, representing 71.9 per cent of
seats in parliament (Zahran 2008: 156).
The fact that there are only 64 additional seats to
contend for nationwide poses a challenge for the
ruling party in determining whom among the
wide pool of women who have served as rank and
file (but who have never really enjoyed much
political leadership or power) will be nominated
under the quota system in the forthcoming
elections. In March 2010, the strains and tensions
of trying to predict who will be supported had
come to the surface, leading to speculations that
parties, in particular the NDP, had deliberately
postponed announcing the list of nominees in
order to minimise political loss. Competition over
whom among the women members of the NDP
should be fielded under the quota system is
fierce, and those who have not been selected may
react to their exclusion in unpredictable ways.
The stakes also apply to other parties. One young
prospective female candidate from the Tagammu
leftist party argued that the names of the women
who will be put forward by her party have yet to
be announced because they are probably trying to
avert conflict arising between the central
headquarters and the party offices at the
governorate level over who should be put forward.
The only substantial competition to the ruling
party comes from the Muslim Brotherhood, the
largest opposition with a populist base that was
able to secure 88 seats of the 454-seat
parliament in the last elections of 2005. The
Muslim Brotherhood is a movement that is
officially outlawed but in practice tolerated
(although subject to waves of security
crackdown).8 Some female members of the
Muslim Brotherhood are active in the religious
and welfare services provided through mosques
and affiliate welfare-providing organisations. A
leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood in
parliament pointed out that they are likely to
field about 20 women candidates for the quota
seats but that in view of the security risks
associated with their members fielding elections,
not many families will grant permission to their
female members to participate in the elections
(he pointed out that they, the Brotherhood, ask
for the permission of the husband to allow his
wife to field the candidate before they back her).
While the quota is neither going to challenge the
NDP hegemony over the outcome of the electoral
process, or contest the male-biased gender
hierarchies within the political parties, it may
serve as a bargaining chip between the ruling
party and opposition parties in backstage
political processes. The idea put forward by some
political spectators is that in cases where the
electoral districts are claimed by the NDP,
‘substitute seats’ can be given to the Muslim
Brotherhood and a handful of opposition
members. Fatma Shoeb, the head of the women’s
committee at the central headquarters of El
Ghad (Future) Party, one of the newly
established political parties, argues that the
government will seek to give the semblance of
being democratic by perhaps allocating 10–15 of
these seats to the opposition and hence, the
opportunities of having women from the
opposition being represented in parliament are
going to be higher.9
5 Engendering authoritarianism or beyond?
While there is a need for affirmative action, the
quota falls short, quantity and quality wise, of
the aspirations of having an initiative that is able
to significantly expand the opportunities for
more women to claim political office. The 64
seats represent no more than 11 per cent of
parliament, and therefore fall short of the
aspirations for at least 30 per cent
representation. In terms of the form the quota
has taken, in its current context, it is not likely
to challenge power hierarchies within parties or
among the parties. It is also not likely to
challenge gender hierarchies in society or within
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parties in significant ways, despite the fact that
it will ultimately increase marginally, women’s
political representation in parliament. Certainly
it is not expected that any form of affirmative
action will serve as a panacea for any country’s
wide array of historical, structural and political
discrepancies and inequalities.
One argument put forward in Parliament by the
Muslim Brotherhood and others is that if the
forms of political repression and corruption
prevalent in the system are addressed (reforming
electoral law and practice, eliminating violence,
thuggery and seeking to control vote purchase),
this would in and of itself create an enabling
environment for women’s political accession of
power. This is certainly difficult to test on the
ground, however, there are still gender-specific
forms of discrimination that would need to be
addressed – including affirmative action. Efforts
to make the political system more inclusive to
women cannot be postponed until authoritarian
rule is overturned. If the quota appeared in the
form that feminists have long advocated and
which the National Council for Women sought to
promote – namely, a proportional party list
system (with conditions), then at least parties
would have been obliged to alter their structures
in order for women to claim leadership positions.
Yet the rumours about the size of the electorate
district have already created a high level of
insecurity among women who were considering
fielding the elections, even as independents. In
that sense, the quota may privilege women who
have the financial and political resources to cover
wide territories quickly, as opposed to those who
have for years built a strong constituency. The
latter are more likely to benefit from competing
for the non-quota seats.
The quota will increase the number of women in
parliament marginally, but it will not address the
power inequities that have disadvantaged women
who are not affiliated to the National
Democratic Party. The NCW has provided
training to more than 3,000 women and invited
women affiliated to all political parties to
participate (a fact that many women from the
opposition were quick to confirm).10 However, its
refusal to take on the advocacy of cases of women
candidates’ exposure to sexual harassment,
violence and vote rigging, i.e. the contextual
dynamics that make accession to political office
prohibitive means that inequities are left
untouched. The NCW claims that it does not
wish to adopt a partisan position by providing
technical assistance to individual candidates
fielding the elections, yet without such concerted
efforts, there is no way that women from the
opposition or who run as independents but lack
significant financial and political clout stand a
chance of competing.
It is not enough to ensure equality of access to
participation when power inequalities are so
embedded that by default, interventions will only
serve to reinforce the status quo. Two lawyers
leading two well-known women’s NGOs reported
inadvertently contributing to the hegemonic
dominance of the NDP in political life through
their work to promote women’s political agency.
One activist pointed out that her organisation
was at one point active in helping women in the
poor community to issue electoral cards, which
are required to enable women to vote in the local
council elections, Shura Council (Upper House)
or Parliament. The premise behind the work was
to increase women’s political participation in the
country’s parliamentarian life until she
discovered that in practice it meant more votes
being given to the NDP. By virtue of its standing
in the community and its ability to use money,
favours and promises of services, the NDP was
able to secure these women’s votes. This may
show the weakness of other political parties, but
ultimately, this activist was concerned that in the
light of the political scene, she did not want to be
contributing to its increasing dominance. The
other lawyer pointed out that she had sought to
strengthen women’s activism at the rank and file
level within the political parties by providing
training on relevant skills, strategising, etc. She
went out of her way to invite as many women as
possible from the different political parties but
in the end she found that the overwhelming
majority came from the National Democratic
Party – and decided against going ahead with the
initiative because of the extreme bias in
representation, which she could not overcome.
She too did not want to be inadvertently
supporting the NDP.
The question is, what kind of affirmative action
would contribute most to creating an enabling
environment under the current political climate?
Certainly, the absence of a strong feminist
movement that is able to enter into dialogue
with women candidates, political parties and
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other stakeholders significantly undermines the
prospects of en-gendering actors and agendas.
This article argues that if the projected scenario
for how the quota will be implemented comes
true: namely the electoral district is defined in
terms much larger, then this would be, in many
ways, disabling for women, even if they are not
competing with men. Under such circumstances,
it would make sense for any women candidates
who do have strong constituencies on the ground
not to field themselves under the quota seats.
Even in electoral authoritarian regimes, there is
a high level of unpredictability due to several
dynamics, including (a) how external pressures
will influence the regime; (b) how the ruling
regime will mediate its relationships with various
political forces through backstage politics;
(c) the kind of political spaces which are not as
controlled which provide ‘exceptional’
opportunities for gaining ground, and (d) how
women candidates’ exercise their agency. Each of
these will be briefly summarised below.
With respect to the role of external actors, i.e.
Western governments, donors, and international
civil society organisations, much will depend on
whether the quota is celebrated for its pro forma
nature (especially in view of the regime’s efforts
to use the quota as a manifestation that it is
edging closer towards democracy) or whether
there will be scrutiny over which women are able
to benefit from the quota. Moreover, the kind of
behind the scenes political deals which the
regime is likely to try and strike to meet the
demands of giving the electoral process sufficient
credibility to be taken somewhat seriously while
maintaining the status quo, are also likely to
produce some unforeseen results, possibly
entailing the allocation of particular seats to
women candidates from the opposition.
Since electoral ‘semi’-authoritarian regimes also
afford a degree of political space, there are
exceptional cases in which women do reach office
by having a long-standing constituency or relying
on their family/tribal endorsement or some other
context-specific factor without relying on
purchase of votes or National Democratic Party
support. Finally, there is a certain level of
unpredictability in how individual agency is
exercised, even in cases where women are
expected to tow the party line. For example,
Georgette Kalliny, one of the five women
appointed in parliament by President Mubarak, is
an official member of the National Democratic
Party. Yet, she has often taken oppositional
stances in parliament against the government (in
complete violation of the conventional norms of
engagement for other NDP affiliates). Moreover,
she openly clashed with the party’s leading figure
and business tycoon, Ahmed Ezz, over her refusal
to back down on her stance calling the
government to account for its complicity in the
eruption of sectarian classes that took place in
Upper Egypt in January 2009. Hence, even the
most hegemonic political party cannot guarantee
control over MPs’ agency all of the time.
6 Conclusion
By the time this article is published, the
executive regulations are likely to have been
published and we will know whether the most
flexible or inhibitive interpretation of the law
has been advanced. Notwithstanding, it remains
that structurally, the quota is neither going to
secure ‘a critical mass’ in parliament, nor is it
going to be the highway to power for a critical
mass of women from the opposition, or those who
have a constituency but not the political clout
and capital to substitute for engaging a larger
electoral district.
While there is a level of unpredictability in the
outcomes of general elections (even in electoral
semi-authoritarian regimes), from the prevalent
messages conveyed to the public regarding size of
electoral district and the number of seats
available in a context of ruling party dominance,
the quota has already come to be associated with
being in line with the existing power dynamics,
namely, that the women MPs with the greatest
financial, social and political clout are likely to be
best positioned to benefit from the new allocated
seats. A technical fix through a change of type of
quota, namely a proportional representation
system would not necessarily be any more
transformative, if the conditions accompanying it
are inhibitive and the will of the ruling party
enacted through the executive and legislative
branches of the government continues to prevail.
While women cannot wait for a regime change to
lobby for greater political representation, there
needs to be no illusion regarding the limits of
what the current quota can offer, as well as the
need for other strategies and pathways of
political empowerment to be pursued. Other
pathways may include the provision of technical
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assistance and mentoring to all women
candidates who are fielding the elections,
including those from the opposition and those
running as independents. Such support would be
sustained throughout the campaigns and if they
win, in the stage after that, rather than provided
in short phase fashion.11 A longer, but essential
pathway is to strengthen women’s abilities to
build relationships with constituencies, even if it
takes years. Ultimately, there is a need to
capitalise on the media interest in gendered
dimensions of politics in order to expose acts of
sexual harassment and election misconduct and
name and shame those complicit. This would not
necessarily transform election practices
overnight, but it would put the issue in the
spotlight, and if sustained over a long period, may
help in mobilising public opinion against it. It is
also important to encourage the emergence of a
feminist caucus in parliament, an extremely
important collective political actor in many other
country contexts. Some pathways may not have
women candidates as their focus, but may be
equally important in creating the enabling
environments for them, and for future
generations of women activists such as
revitalising the feminist movement in Egypt in
order to play a more forceful role in influencing
the debates on political empowerment. Finally, it
cannot be stressed enough that pathways of
political power are trodden in sociopolitical and
economic contexts whose dynamics are critical
for how the intersection of gender, class, religion
and political orientation play out.
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Notes
* This research was conducted with the Cairo-
based Middle East Hub of Pathways of
Women’s Empowerment. I am very grateful to
Dr Hania Sholkamy of the Social Research
Center at the American University in Cairo,
for her facilitation of this research, her
contribution to the framing of the research
questions and her constant helpful feedback. I
am also very indebted to Sawsan Sherif and
Zeinab Ali, senior researchers at the Social
Research Center who undertook semi-
structured interviews with over 40 women
participants in the training programme hosted
by the National Council for Women’s political
empowerment programme. A series of semi-
structured interviews were conducted by the
author, Zeinab and Sawsan, with various
stakeholders: Dr Mahmoud Sherif, Director of
the political empowerment programme,
programme officers responsible for the training
programme, as well as leading members of
different political parties and forces and NGO
activists in Cairo and Upper Egypt. A review of
press articles, training material and scholarly
and grey literature in both Arabic and English
was undertaken by the author to complement
the primary data. Finally, many thanks to Ms
Mona Bakr whose exceptional coordination and
management skills were key in making this
initiative materialise.
1 Hawanim is the plural of hanim, an Arabic word
that means a woman of aristocratic or upper
class, or Lady. Garden City is an upper class
residential suburb in the heart of Cairo,
historically (and to this day), known to be
home to the members of the aristocratic or
upper class.
2 Shortly after, businesswoman Shahinaz el
Naggar resigned as MP for el Manial district,
after she married business tycoon Ahmed Ezz,
thus reducing the number of women in
parliament to eight.
3 Because of the sensitivity of the subject
matter, the identity of the interviewee has
been kept anonymous here.
4 Interview, October 2009.
5 One of Egypt’s oldest political parties; was in
power for several terms prior to the 1950s.
6 Interview, October 2009.
7 Interview, October 2009.
8 The Muslim Brotherhood announced their
party platform in 2008; however, they refused
to submit an official registration application for
the establishment of a political party because,
they explained, of its inevitable rejection by a
partisan political parties committee.
9 Interview, January 2009.
10 An article discussing the findings of the research
on the training programme provided by the
National Council for Women as well as other
NGOs, their nature and the profile of women
who participate in them, and perceptions of
the role these initiatives play in women’s
political paths is explored in an in-depth
manner in a forthcoming paper by the author.
11 For the most part, there are of course women
running as independents and less frequently so
as members of the opposition parties, who have
significant financial means. However, criteria
can be established in order to support women
who need help in a non-partisan manner.
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